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Mobile agents require an appropriate platform that can facilitate their migration and execution. In 
particular, the design and implementation of such a system must balance several factors that will 
ensure that its constituent agents are executed without problems. Besides the basic requirements 
of migration and execution, an agent system must also provide mechanisms to ensure the 
security and survivability of an agent when it migrates between hosts. In addition, the system 
should be simple enough to facilitate its widespread use across large scale networks (i.e Internet). 
 
To address these issues, this thesis discusses the design and implementation of the Distributed 
Agent Delivery System (DADS). The DADS provides a de-coupled design that separates agent 
acceptance from agent execution. Using functional modules, the DADS provides services 
ranging from language execution and security to fault-tolerance and compression.  Modules 
allow the administrator(s) of hosts to declare, at run-time, the services that they want to provide. 
Since each administrative domain is different, the DADS provides a platform that can be adapted 
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The concept of an intelligent agent has been around for quite some time. First
described in the literature of artificial intelligence, an agent is code that acts on
behalf of a user [20]. In addition to code, an agent carries some associated data.
This facilitates autonomy, where an agent can perform tasks with little to no user
interaction. Since they are programs, agents require a platform that will execute
their instructions. In the context of an operating system, an agent may execute as a
running process or as code executing in an interpreter. For an interpreted agent, code
executes within the context of an interpreter and uses the functionality provided by
it. Regardless of how an agent is executed, the underlying platform that makes agent
execution possible is defined as the agent’s infrastructure. Unless an infrastructure
provides conventions for code mobility, agents remain on the local host, making them
static. Therefore, before an infrastructure can support code mobility, it must first
provide functionality that will facilitate the transfer of an agent’s code and data to
other hosts.
An infrastructure facilitates the execution of the instructions that are carried by
1
an agent. In addition, it makes resources available to the agents that use it. Given
the intimate relationship between an agent’s code and execution platform, many
infrastructures employ a virtual machine (e.g., Java1 Virtual Machine) where agent
functionality is incorporated into the execution platform directly, making it agent-
oriented. In this context, agents are written in a high level language and compiled
into a byte-code that is specific to the virtual machine. This facilitates portability
since the virtual machine provides an execution platform that is independent of a
host’s architecture. However, the virtual machine model has its disadvantages. For
instance, virtual machines place a number of limitations on the agents that it can
support. Since it must use the byte-code dictated by the particular virtual machine,
an agent is subject to the fundamental principles of the virtual machine core design
(i.e., security, performance). This may lead to a design that reduces the overall
effectiveness of the agent paradigm since it creates an environment that may be
geared toward certain applications. Also, since there is no universal virtual machine
that recognizes all languages [26], the choice of language is limited when developers
need to select a language for agent development.
Our goal is to move agents away from the limitations of a single virtual machine
architecture, making the availability of the agent paradigm more widespread. Similar
1
 
Sun Microsystems Inc., Java, December 7 1999, http://java.sun.com
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to standard network services such as Telnet or the File Transfer Protocol (FTP), hosts
within a network could offer a standard service designed specifically for agents. When
a host executes an FTP daemon, that host makes file transfer service available for all
to use. Similarly, we would like to see the agent paradigm follow this same principle.
Instead of an infrastructure that supports one specific type of an agent, we would
like to see a system that can accept and execute a heterogeneous blend of agents.
Since it is not designed around the specifications of one particular virtual machine,
such a platform can encompass a larger set of hosts, thereby providing access to
an extended number of computing resources. However, increased access to resources
introduces several new issues that must be considered. First, a security model must be
developed that is flexible enough to secure both a host and agent. Since heterogeneous
agents may be accepted, different agents will inevitably use different forms of security.
Second, to facilitate heterogeneity, an agent infrastructure must be multi-lingual.
That is, compilers and interpreters for different languages must be made available
at the constituent sites. And third, the agent infrastructure must support robust
mechanisms for fault tolerance. Since an agent executes autonomously, it is the
responsibility of the underlying agent platform to provide methods for recovery in the
event of a fatal error. In general, different hosts may be configured with dissimilar
services, thus, it is imperative that the availability of a particular service be advertised
3
to incoming agents. This provides an agent with sufficient information to determine
whether the host meets its resource requirements. To facilitate the communication of
this information, a protocol must be developed.
In order to build an agent platform it is necessary to review the requirements
of an agent and the environment in which it executes. With important issues such
as performance, security, and fault tolerance, an infrastructure must balance several
factors to obtain efficient and secure agent delivery across heterogeneous networks.
Unfortunately, diversity among existing agent systems has made the adoption of an
agent standard difficult. As a result, many infrastructures have used agents and
protocols of their own design, thereby reducing some of the potential for interaction
between infrastructures. To address some of these issues, we introduce the Distributed
Agent Delivery System (DADS).
Executed as a daemon process that listens for incoming agents on a network, the
DADS acts as a portal to computing resources. Using a plug-in style interface, these
resources are made available as loadable services, referred to asmodules. Influenced by
the organization of AgentTcl [12], a module can be used to provide language services.
In addition, DADS modules also provide services such as compilation, security, fault
tolerance, and data compression. In general, modules facilitate the dynamic loading
of services, hence, they can be brought online when they are needed and taken off-line
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when they are idle. When compared to systems that define their services at build
time, a dynamic configuration is much more attractive.
Influenced by the agent design introduced in the Tromsø And COrnell Moving
Agents (TACOMA) system [19], a DADS agent consists of three segments: code, data,
and properties. Using the terminology of TACOMA, a DADS agent is comparable to
a briefcase containing three folders. The code segment stores the instructions that are
executed by an agent. The contents of the data segment represent the agent’s state.
And the properties segment stores a description of both the code and data segments.
Combined, these three segments make up the network transmittable structure referred
to as a DADS agent.
The code and data segments are designed to store arbitrary sequences of bytes,
hence, a DADS agent is inherently multi-lingual. As an autonomous entity, an agent
must be able interact with other hosts. Since autonomy dictates no user interaction,
it is imperative that the agent maintain a description of itself (i.e., language, security,
etc.) to communicate. Without a description, agents would not be able to decide
which hosts can facilitate execution and guarantee the agent’s survival. To address
this, a DADS agent uses a properties segment to describe its contents. Influenced by
the concept of a badge in Mole [4], the properties segment is designed to facilitate
agent migration and agent-to-agent interaction. That is, it provides an agent with a
5
description of itself (i.e., language, security, etc.) that can be used during the transfer
protocol or when agents meet. As work on an agent standard continues[10, 7], the
properties segment can be easily adapted to conform to a standards based description.
Related Work
In recent years, many discoveries have been made in agent based computing. Most
important have been the advancements made in the area of agent systems. Building
on some of the basic principles discussed above, research in agent systems has intro-
duced many new and interesting concepts to the area of code mobility. In addition,
ongoing research has promoted the exchange of ideas, creating a new generation of
hybrid systems. Subscribing to a hybrid model, the DADS expands upon some of the
concepts found in some of today’s systems. In this section, we introduce some of the
systems that have influenced the DADS design. In addition, we briefly describe some
of today’s proposed agent standards.
Telescript Designed primarily for a proprietary hand-held device, Telescript2 [27] is
one of the first mobile agent systems ever developed. A pioneer in the field, Telescript
is one of the first systems to support agents using a virtual machine architecture. A
predecessor to the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), Telescript uses a Telescript Engine
2
 
General Magic Inc., Telescript, June 4 1996, http://www.genmagic.com
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to execute byte-code instructions that are compiled from the Telescript language.
Similar to Java, Telescript uses an object model to facilitate the implementation of
what is known as its agents and places. Comparable to the initial agent definition
given above, an agent is an entity that encompasses the code mobility aspect of the
Telescript system. Utilizing a secure virtual machine architecture, Telescript restricts
its agents from directly accessing the underlying operating system on a host. Instead,
it makes the agents interact with what is referred to as a place. In contrast to an agent,
a place is delegated access to certain resources on a host. Coincidentally, a place is
simply a static agent that is used as a proxy to resources. A host may offer multiple
places, hence, each place may offer a different service. Further, multiple agents can
interact with any number of places concurrently. Thus, whenever a Telescript agent
migrates, the agent does not access resources on the host directly. Instead, an agent
interacts with other agents and places via meetings, which facilitate the setup and
execution of inter-agent communication and information exchange. Best described as
an electronic marketplace [27], the principles of agents and places is analogous to the
interactions of humans in the physical world.
Telescript has introduced several concepts to the mobile agent paradigm. In ad-
dition to places and meetings, Telescript is the first agent system to introduce the
concept of single-instruction agent migration. That is, an agent can migrate with a
7
simple call to the go function. This suspends agent execution, packages the agent, and
transmits it to a destination. This avoids having an agent provide its own transfer
functionality, thereby reducing its overall complexity.
Aglets An Application Programming Interface (API) for Java, Aglets3 [18, 1] offer
an agent infrastructure designed around the Java object model. Similar to Telescript,
Aglets also use a virtual machine architecture, the JVM, to execute mobile objects.
Developed under the name of an Aglet, these mobile objects execute as Java threads.
In the Aglet system, a running Aglet (thread) is referred to as a context, where it
is subject to all of the advantages (i.e., security, portability) offered by the JVM.
Built upon the Java object model, Aglets are fairly easy to implement since many
developers are already familiar with Java.
Using the same principles as the go instruction available in Telescript, Aglets
provide mobility through a dispatch function. This function suspends a context,
packages it, and transmits it to a destination host. At the destination, an object called
a listener waits for an incoming agent transmission. Nothing more than specialized
Aglets, listeners read the incoming contexts from the network, unpackages them, and
resumes their execution on the host.
3
 
Internation Business Machines Corporation (IBM), Aglets, June 29 1999,
http://www.trl.ibm.com/aglets/index e.htm
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The popularity, simplicity, and security of Java has made the Aglet infrastructure
a popular choice within the agent research community. However, as mentioned by
Jim White, one of the lead developers of Telescript:
Telescript and Java virtual machines share one important trait; they in-
stitutionalize a particular object model...A better approach is a virtual
machine that is language neutral. [26]
A disadvantage of the virtual machine, predefined object models require that all agent
execution ultimately use the byte-code of that particular virtual machine. Since each
agent system is designed to function with its own agents, predefined object models
enforce a structured agent design. In addition, it reduces the interoperability of the
agent with other systems since the byte-code cannot execute without the particular
virtual machine. Also, developers are limited in their choice of agent language, hence,
if the developer needs to use certain functionality of a language and it does not compile
down to JVM byte-code, the developer might not be able to use the Aglet system at
all.
AgentTcl One of the most flexible of today’s mobile agent infrastructures, AgentTcl
[12] (currently D’Agents) introduces several refreshing concepts to the area of agent
mobility. Moving away from the single virtual machine design, AgentTcl employs
9
a collection of loadable interpreters for agent execution. Since different interpreters
are made available concurrently, AgentTcl can handle multi-lingual agents. Further,
since certain languages may be specialized for certain applications (i.e., speed, secu-
rity, portability). The choice of language gives developers the flexibility to use an
agent that fits the needs of their applications. In addition, a developer may choose a
familiar language, thereby decreasing development time.
The AgentTcl infrastructure is divided into two halves. The first half consists of a
single daemon process referred to as agentd. This daemon listens on the network for
agents that wish to migrate. When a migration request is received, agentd accepts
the transmitted agent. The second half, a collection of interpreters, is responsible for
agent execution. Thus, when agentd receives an agent from the network, it forwards
the agent to a loaded interpreter for execution.
During its execution, an interpreter maintains a context (i.e., code, stack, vari-
ables) that correlate to a program’s execution. Also known as state, this information
contains all of the data needed to execute the program within the particular inter-
preter. In AgentTcl, this state information constitutes an agent. That is, if we were
to take a snapshot of a running program in an interpreter, the suspended context
contains program code and data, which follows our definition for an agent. To fa-
cilitate mobility, AgentTcl uses a method known as state-capture. Using a modified
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interpreter, agents can perform state-capture by making a function call similar to the
go and dispatch functions used in Telescript and Aglets, respectively. In general, this
call suspends execution, takes a snapshot of the current context, opens a connection
to a remote AgentTcl host, and transmits it. At the remote host, this information is
read and used to create a new context for continued execution.
The modular design offered by AgentTcl makes it a very attractive infrastructure
for experimental agent research. Supporting languages such as Tcl, Python, Scheme,
and Lisp, AgentTcl provides a flexible platform for multi-lingual agents. State-capture
allows AgentTcl to be as efficient as possible by reducing the amount of time consumed
during agent transfer, however, it also requires the addition of special functionality to
an interpreter. That is, an interpreter must be modified in order to support the state-
capture routines. Since there are many interpreted languages that do not support
this functionality, users must wait for the AgentTcl development team to provide
support. While it is possible for an AgentTcl user to add this support themselves,
modification of an interpreter requires time and resources. Further, not all interpreters
are open source, hence, code modification may not be possible without direct vendor
involvement.
11
Mole Built upon the JVM, Mole [4] also uses a virtual machine architecture. Similar
to Aglets, a Mole agent is simply a Java thread. In addition, Mole incorporates some
of the features introduced by Telescript, namely the concept of an agent and a place.
Similar to Telescript, agents are restricted direct access to a host’s resources. Instead,
Mole also uses a collection of places (i.e., static agents) to act as proxies to resources.
Similar to a meeting, Mole agents initiate sessions to interact with places. Sessions
facilitate the exchange of information between an agent and place.
Unique identification of an agent is important. Since many agents may exist
concurrently across a large domain, it is advantageous to be able to identify one agent
from another. Further, it would be advantageous for an agent to engage in sessions
with agents that are performing similar tasks. Before a session can be established,
an agent must know what service is provided by a particular place. Likewise, a
unique identifier allows every agent and place to be accounted for. To address this,
Mole uses a unique identification scheme. Designed to facilitate session setup, Mole’s
identification scheme combines the concept of a globally unique agent-id with an
application specific identifier, known as a badge. Geared specifically for its mobile
agents, a badge allows an agent to advertise its application specific properties. Thus,
when an agent wants to engage in a session with another agent or place, the parties
involved can use the badge information to determine which agents are performing
12
similar tasks.
TACOMA One of the earliest implementations of a mobile agent infrastructure,
TACOMA [19] introduces some very interesting concepts to agent mobility. In its
earliest version, TACOMA defines its agent as a Tcl procedure. Unlike systems that
use virtual machine threads or captured state information, a TACOMA agent uses the
code from a high level programming language. This means that state information is
not implicitly coupled with the code as it is with a state-captured image. Instead, this
information must be explicitly programmed and stored with the agent. To facilitate
this, TACOMA employs a system of briefcases and folders. Forming a two level
hierarchy, a briefcase may contain several folders, whereas a folder contains agent
data. A folder may contain any arbitrary sequence of bits, thereby avoiding any
limitations on the data that it contains. Further, a folder is referenced through a
descriptive name. For instance, an agent may carry a briefcase that contains a folder
labelled CODE. This folder may include the Tcl procedure defining the actions of
that particular agent. Likewise, before an agent migrates, it must reference the folder
labelled HOST to determine its destination.
Parallel to other infrastructures, TACOMA agents require interaction with other
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agents for execution. Using a meet operation, a TACOMA agent exchanges its brief-
case with another agent. The receiver opens the briefcase, references the CODE
folder, and executes the associated code. The simplicity of this model is very in-
triguing. Since the contents of a folder are not restricted, an agent’s contents are
no longer bound to the specifications of the underlying infrastructure (i.e., language,
architecture).
FIPA As more agent systems are developed, system interoperability becomes a
problem. Since a host may execute more than one infrastructure concurrently, it
would be advantageous for the agents of the concurrent infrastructures to commu-
nicate. Unfortunately, agents of one infrastructure may not understand the context
in which other agents execute. To interact, one of the systems must be modified.
Inevitably, this leads to the question of which system to modify. Since some systems
are not open-source, modification of a system to fit the needs of another may be
impossible. Also, many agent systems exist, hence, it would also be impractical to
support the requirements of each. Consequently, a standard for interoperability has
become imperative.
Designed to promote an open standard for agent system design, the FIPA spec-
ification is one of the most comprehensive specifications for agent systems thus far.
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Described best by its mission statement, FIPA’s mission is:
The promotion of technologies and interoperability specifications that fa-
cilitate the end-to-end interworking of intelligent agent systems in modern
commercial and industrial settings. [10]
FIPA provides an extensive collection of specifications designed to aid developers in
building inter-operable infrastructures. Unfortunately, many of today’s infrastruc-
tures do not support the FIPA standard, or for that matter, any standard at all.
This not only reduces the effectiveness of a particular system, but it also reduces the
effectiveness of the agent paradigm itself.
MASIF Developed by the Object Management Group (OMG4) [21], MASIF [7]
provides another standard for interoperability among agent systems. Intended as
an open standard, MASIF is built on top of the CORBA5 system. Best stated by
its specification, MASIF is “a collection of definitions and interfaces that provide an
interoperable interface for mobile agent systems” [7]. MASIF does this by offering a
standard definition for agent naming, management, and transfer which could be used
across agent systems to accommodate interoperability.
4
 
Object Management Group Inc., OMG, September 29 1992, http://www.omg.org
5
 
Object Management Group Inc. CORBA, April 7 1998, http://www.omg.org
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Grasshopper Grasshopper [5] is the first MASIF and FIPA compliant agent sys-
tem ever developed. As discussed by the developers, “Grasshopper is in principle a
MASIF conformant mobile agent platform, which has been enhanced recently with a
FIPA add on, in order to give the application developer total flexibility” [5]. Written
in Java, the Grasshopper platform is designed to provide a completely distributed
agent environment capable of handling agents of varying complexities. Using the
proposed definitions found in MASIF and FIPA (i.e., agent naming, management,
transfer, etc.), Grasshopper offers a comprehensive, standards based solution to agent
systems. Hence, it has been accepted for use in many applications including telecom-
munications and e-commerce.
DADS
Influenced heavily by the design and implementation of the systems above, the
DADS provides an agent platform for the acceptance and execution of heterogeneous
agents. Using a modular design, the DADS provides a virtual gateway to services.
Similar to the concept of a place, DADS services are realized in the form of modules,
where a module provides any number of services ranging from language execution and
security to fault-tolerance and compression. Modules separate agent services from the
core delivery functionality, thereby offering a platform that can support a wider range
16
of agents. Coupled with an agent structure that acts as a mobile container for code
and data, the DADS is an agent system focused on flexibility. As a result, the DADS
uses a unique agent delivery protocol to facilitate heterogeneous agent delivery across
multiple domains (i.e., corporations, universities). Further, when it is needed, this
flexibility allows the DADS to support the proposed standards discussed above.
In what follows, we present the design and implementation of the DADS system.
Beginning with Chapter 2, we discuss some of the pertinent issues encountered during
the design of the DADS. Further, it presents a brief overview of the DADS organiza-
tion, as well as a discussion of how today’s agent systems have influenced the DADS
design.
Following this discussion, the DADS agent is introduced. Specifically, we discuss
its structure, which leads into a description of the property structure used throughout
the DADS system. Further, a development strategy for the DADS agent is presented.
Next, Chapter 2 introduces the DADS daemon. In particular, we discuss the
requirements of a host that would like to participate in an agent system, focusing pri-
marily on how it must facilitate agent migration and execution. Next, a development
strategy for the DADS daemon is presented.
The DADS uses a modular design to provide services. Managed directly by the
DADS daemon, modules are an important feature of the DADS system. Consequently,
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we also discuss the module system, focusing on its design and use. Further, we
supplement this discussion with a concept referred to as module chaining, and follow
up with suggestions for future module development. Finally, a development strategy
for a basic module is presented.
Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion of the agent transfer protocol. Since an
agent and host can use any language, it is imperative that a protocol exist to facili-
tate agent migration. Specifically, we discuss some of the issues involved with agent
migration and illustrate how the DADS solves some of these issues using function-
ality provided by the module system. Last, a development strategy for the transfer
protocol is presented.
In addition to the development strategies discussed for each part of the DADS,
Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of its current implementation. This includes
an in-depth view of the dispatching system and state-machine implementations that
make the overall DADS daemon, and module system work.
Chapter 4 presents a simple example to illustrate the operation of an agent in the
context of the DADS system. In particular, it presents a detailed look at a simple
intrusion detection agent executed within the DADS infrastructure.





There are many issues to consider in the design of a new agent system. For
some systems, speed is preferred over portability. Similarly, security may be more
important than speed. Regardless of how the underlying system is optimized, it
must facilitate the execution and migration of agents across networks. For migration
to occur between unrelated network domains (i.e., corporations, universities, etc.)
the agent system must be portable enough to execute on a variety of architectures.
Further, it must use a security model that can guarantee a secure environment for
all entities involved (i.e., agents, hosts). In general, an agent system addresses the
issues specific to the applications they are designed for. For instance, agent based
e-commerce favors security. Likewise, scientific computing would benefit from fast
and efficient agents. To address these issues, the DADS is designed to offer an agent
system that facilitates agent execution and migration, while at the same time offering
a customizable platform that can adjust to fit the needs of its applications. This
chapter describes the organization of the DADS, focusing primarily on the major
parts that contribute to its operation.
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DADS Organization
The DADS is designed to accept a heterogeneous blend of agents on a variety of
hosts that span unrelated network domains. Illustrated in Figure 2.1, the DADS is
made up of several interrelated parts, namely a daemon and a set of loadable modules.
Described in further detail later, each part contributes to the overall operation of the
















Figure 2.1: DADS Architecture
To participate in a mobile agent infrastructure, a host must provide an entry point
for incoming agents. This requires a network access point, generally a TCP network
port, which is understood by all agents and hosts that participate in the particular
agent system. To achieve this, the DADS relies on a daemon process, labelled DADS
daemon in Figure 2.1, which is designed to listen on a standard TCP network port for
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incoming agents. As we discuss in Chapter 3, the DADS can be adapted to support
other network protocols, not just TCP/IP.
In addition to network access, the DADS is also responsible for two other impor-
tant functions. The first is the management of the service module system. Discussed
in further detail later, modules provide a limitless library of services ranging from lan-
guage availability and security to fault tolerance. Consequently, a host may offer any
combination of services. That is, it is likely that different hosts on different networks
will offer their own selection of services. Hence, an agent cannot presume certain
properties (i.e., language, security) will be available on every host that it attempts
to migrate to. Since an agent is autonomous, it must be able to determine whether
the available resources on a remote host will allow it to execute after it migrates.
Therefore, the second function of the DADS is to provide a transfer protocol (TP) to
facilitate this decision making process. An integral part of the DADS system, the TP
is an important mechanism in the acceptance and execution of heterogeneous agents.
Just like any other agent system, the DADS has its own definition of an agent.
Since the DADS supports a wide range of services through its module system, it can
potentially support a wide range of agent languages and functionality. Consequently,
for an agent to take advantage of these available services, it must be flexible in its
implementation. That is, the agent must be able to support a heterogeneous blend
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of data, regardless of the structure and content. To do this, DADS agents are similar
to the agents used in TACOMA, hence, they act as descriptive containers which
alleviates the limitation on content. Described later, a DADS agent facilitates code
mobility for a wide variety of languages.
The DADS is heavily influenced by the design of today’s agent infrastructures.
Instead of contradicting the many ideas that have been introduced by these systems,
the DADS combines aspects of these concepts into a single agent platform.
DADS Agent Design
Traditionally, there are many different definitions of an agent. For AgentTcl, an
agent is a state-captured image of an interpreter context, whereas Aglets and Mole
agents are suspended JVM threads. TACOMA agents are high-level Tcl Procedures.
Regardless of the system, the common property shared among the agents is that
they contain a set of instructions and data. The instructions define the actions and
behavior of an agent, whereas the data stores agent state.
Without a supporting infrastructure, agent mobility is impossible. In AgentTcl,
agents cannot transfer unless they migrate to hosts running the AgentTcl system.
Likewise, Telescript agents are unable to execute remotely unless a Telescript engine
is available. In general, agents are dependent on their infrastructure for mobility and
22
execution. Frequently, mobility is achieved through special functionality that is built
into the infrastructure core. Thus, when an agent requires transfer, it calls functions
that package and transmit an agent to another host. In general, this functionality is
placed directly into a language execution environment (i.e., modified virtual machine),
thereby limiting the agent language to that of the execution platform. This creates
an agent that is subject to all of the (dis)advantages of that particular language
platform (i.e., speed, security, portability). Consequently, dependencies lead to niche
infrastructures that work solely with agents of their own design.
In the context of DADS, an agent uses a design that is influenced by the TACOMA
system. Expanding on its briefcase and folder concept, DADS agents act as containers
(i.e., briefcase) for three distinct segments (i.e., folders). Unlike TACOMA where
a briefcase can contain any number of folders, a DADS agent always contains the
following three segments:
Code: Stores instructions that are used to determine the behavior of an agent. This
segment can contain any arbitrary sequence of bits. Thus, it can store any
language, byte-code, or state-captured image.
Data: Stores state information and gathered data used by an agent during execution.
This segment may also contain any arbitrary sequence of bits.
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Properties: Stores a description of the code and data segments. Thus, the proper-










Foreach $action in Task
$result = Execute ( $action )
Transfer ( Itinerary[$index] )
$index = Evaluate( $result )
Language = pseudocode
Compression = Burrows−Wheeler
Authentication = Proxy Certificate









Figure 2.2: A DADS Agent
Further illustrated in Figure 2.2, code and data segments are complemented by
the descriptive information found in the properties segment. This properties segment
is very important to the operation of the DADS. Since the DADS does not limit the
contents of an agent’s code and data segments, DADS agents are free-form. This
means agents can use any format for their language and data. When they are mobile,
agents become free-form autonomous entities. If they are used across heterogeneous
networks, it is impractical to assume that computing resources on every host are the
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same. Nevertheless, an agent must be able to migrate, hence, it must be able to deter-
mine whether it can execute on a remote host. Without some form of identification,
an agent cannot compare the available resources on a host with its requirements for
migration and execution. To address this, DADS agents are equipped with a prop-
erties segment. Similar to a badge in Mole, the properties segment enables an agent
to have knowledge about itself (i.e., language, security, fault-tolerance requirements).
When used in conjunction with a transfer protocol, this knowledge allows us to ex-
ploit the specifications of an agent in terms of its requirements and its capabilities.
As a result, an agent can map knowledge of itself onto its knowledge of a host (i.e.,
language platforms, security, fault-tolerance mechanisms). This allows it to make an
informed decision about whether it can migrate and execute on a remote host. Simi-
larly, when a host requires authentication, this properties segment allows the host to
be able to understand whether the agent is capable of supporting the authentication
it requires. Further, it avoids an agent format that is dictated by the implementation
details of the infrastructure.
Properties
In contrast to the format used with the code and data segments, the format of
the properties segment is fairly restrictive. A restrictive format is imperative since an
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agent must be able to reference knowledge of itself quickly. Further, the format must
facilitate a concise description that can succinctly describe all relevant information
about the agent. To do this, the DADS uses a descriptive element which we refer to as
a property structure. In general, a property structure contains four distinct elements:
Property Label: An identifier which labels the property as a capability (c), require-
ment (r), or both (b). This field facilitates the construction of requirement and
capability sub-trees used with the transfer protocol.
Property ID: A standard number used to refer to a particular service. This number
could be defined according to a local administrative domain or it could refer
to a standardized number similar to the management information base (MIB)
used for SNMP [6]. When moved to a global scale, this would require a globally
accepted standard defined by a centralized unit, such as the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) [14].
Property Name: A string used to describe the particular property. For instance, the
Perl interpreter may use a Property Name of “Perl”. In general, this would be
used whenever the property ID cannot be matched.
Sub-Properties: A list of properties that further describe the particular property. For
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instance, an agent may have an “Interpreter” property that consists of the sub-






































Figure 2.3: Property Hierarchy
Further illustrated in Figure 2.3, the property structure uses its sub-property element
to form a hierarchical description of an agent, which we refer to as a property hierarchy.
In this particular example, the agent’s description is simple. The root represents the
Property property from which a language, security, and compression sub-property
are contained. As we descend the branches of this hierarchy, the agent description
becomes more specific.
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In addition to the description of an agent, property structures are also used by
the DADS daemon to describe its loaded modules. Thus, property structures can be
exchanged to determine whether agents can migrate and execute on remote hosts.
Since an agent and a remote DADS-enabled host would use the same hierarchical
format, it is possible to execute fast search algorithms to determine whether an agent’s
property hierarchy can match a subtree in the hosts property hierarchy.
In general, a property hierarchy contains descriptive paths that describe the re-
quirements and capabilities of an entity (i.e., host, agent). In the context of the
DADS, a requirement is defined as the functional service that is needed by an entity
to successfully perform its tasks, whereas a capability is defined as a service that an
entity can support. For instance, if an agent is written in the Perl language, it needs
a Perl interpreter to execute, hence, the agent property hierarchy would contain a
path in the property hierarchy that specifies the Perl interpreter as a requirement.
Juxtaposed, a host does not need the Perl interpreter to execute, however, it needs
to know that this service is available for agents to use. As a result, the host’s prop-
erty hierarchy would contain a path in its property hierarchy that indicates the Perl
language interpreter as a capability.
Similarly, it is common for a host to use a form of authentication that will verify
an agent’s authenticity. In order to perform its task, an agent may not need to
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authenticate, however, it is imperative that the agent understand that it can support
a form of authentication if it is required by a host. Consequently, the agent’s property
hierarchy will contain a path to a capability that indicates that it can support the
desired form of authentication. Likewise, a host may want authentication to occur
before an agent is allowed to execute, hence, it will contain a path to a requirement
that indicates the form of authentication that must be satisfied.
In the context of a property hierarchy, the delineation between a capability and a
requirement is determined by the agent and host. That is, when an agent engages in
the transfer protocol, it sends a subtree of properties derived from the paths in the
property hierarchy that it has marked as capabilities. When this subtree is received
by a host, it is compared to the requirements subtree on the host. This allows the
host to select, from the agent’s capability tree, the service it wants the agent to use.
Similarly, after the host has made a decision, it sends its capability subtree to the
agent, thereby allowing it to decide which service (i.e., authentication) it would like
to use. In general, an agent and host do not send their complete property hierarchy
across the wire, instead they send subtrees that have been derived from it.
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Development Strategy
A DADS agent is best described as a mobile container for code and data. It
provides a containment structure used to organize and describe arbitrary sequences
of code and data. A DADS agent is separated into three segments. As discussed
above, each of these segments hold a piece of information that is integral to an agent’s
operation. Since there are no limitations on code and data, a DADS agent provides
a general vehicle for code and data transfer. This generality motivates a simple
implementation. Illustrated in Figure 2.4, we present the basic format for an agent
as it is used within the DADS infrastructure. As the code exhibits, an agent contains
three distinct pointers, namely Code, Data, and a list of Property structures. In our
initial implementation, the property structure has been kept relatively simple. If
further attributes are needed to describe a property, they can be added. For now,
we have included the four fields: a label label, a property id prop id, a property
name prop name, and a property pointer *sub prop which facilitates the creation of
a property hierarchy.
It is interesting to note how simple a DADS agent is. As discussed above, one
of the main goals is to avoid an agent that is far too dependent on its underlying
infrastructure. An agent system should facilitate mobility without placing a high
number of restrictions on its agents. As Figure 2.4 shows, a DADS agent offers an
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/* A Property Structure */
typedef struct service prop {
enum { B,C,R } label; // b = both, c = capability, r = requirement
long prop id;
char prop name[MAXNAMELEN];
struct service prop *sub prop[MAXSUBPROPS];
} Property;
/* An Agent */
class Agent { 10
public:
enum agent field { CODE, DATA, PROPERTY };
void *getField(agent field af);









Figure 2.4: Agent Structure
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interface to the contents of the agent without limiting its contents. This allows any
segment of the agent to be easily referenced when it is needed.
The structure illustrated in Figure 2.4 is transparent to the user of a DADS agent.
Instead of writing the agent to fit this format, a user writes an agent in the language
of his/her choice and uses a special program called an injector to bootstrap an agent
into the DADS system. Consequently, this program creates the structure described
in Figure 2.4 by combining the code, data, and description of the agent. In addition,
the injector transmits the agent according to the transfer protocol to a remote DADS
enabled host for execution.
DADS Daemon
In order to participate in an agent system, a host must provide an entry point (i.e.,
TCP port) for agent acceptance. In addition, it must facilitate agent execution. In
Telescript, a virtual machine provides this functionality, handling both agent migra-
tion and execution directly. In contrast, AgentTcl uses a dedicated process (agentd)
which is responsible for accepting new agents and delegates them to independent
processes (i.e., interpreters) for execution. In general, a host participates in an agent
system by executing a daemon that can accept incoming agents. This daemon may
be directly involved in the execution of the agent, or it may off-load the execution
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somewhere else. Regardless of how the agent is executed, it is the responsibility of
the daemon to define how the resources (i.e., languages, security, etc.) are used.
In a centrally managed network, node homogeneity is achievable. Since each
host is administered by a central authority, installation of a uniformly configured
agent system is possible. As discussed by Karnik and Tripathi [17], “In a completely
closed local area network...it is possible to trust all machines and the software installed
on them”. This level of trust is lost when an agent system is distributed across
heterogeneous networks. Since different institutions may employ orthogonal policies
(i.e., security, resource usage), it may not be possible to install a uniform configuration
across all hosts. Therefore, it is imperative that an agent system allow the network
administrator(s) to customize their hosts according to their own policies.
There are several issues to consider in the design of the DADS daemon. First,
it must be able to accept and execute migrating agents from remote hosts. When
we consider how general the DADS agent is, it is clear that an agent may contain
any form of code and data. Hence, the DADS daemon must be able to handle
any of the agent languages of its constituent agents. And second, it must provide a
customizable platform that can adjust to the policies of an institution. To do this, the
DADS daemon employs a design where the functionality for migration and language
execution are separated. Parallel to AgentTcl, this design allows the DADS daemon
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to focus on agent migration, allowing language execution to be off-loaded to other
processes.
Development Strategy
The main focus of the DADS daemon is to provide two services, namely the
acceptance of agents and the management of modules. Both of these services require
a clean and efficient interface that can handle high volumes of agent interaction.
Further, in order to run as a system level service, the final product must be simple.
The implementation of the DADS daemon is focused on an object oriented design.
Built using the object model found in Figure 2.5, the DADS daemon is organized such
that higher level objects provide simplistic interfaces to lower-level functionality. That








Figure 2.5: DADS Daemon Object Hierarchy
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Located at the bottom of the object hierarchy, service objects encapsulate the low-
level functionality specific to a particular management function. Labelled Network
and Module, these objects provide an interface to functionality such as connection
handling, name resolution, and I/O. Hence, it is within these objects that the code
for socket manipulation (i.e., pipe, accept, read, write) is found.
At the next level up, we encounter two intermediate controller objects, namely
the Agent Service Protocol (ASP) and Module Service Protocol (MSP) objects. It is
within these objects that the protocols specific to DADS (i.e., agent delivery, module
loading) are defined. In particular, methods provided by the Network object are used
by the ASP object to execute the delivery protocol. Similarly, methods provided by
the Module object are used by the MSP object to execute the loading protocol. As
Chapter 3 explains, the ASP and MSP objects encapsulate the state-machines that
facilitate execution of the particular protocols.
Next, the ASP and MSP objects are placed within a DADS Delivery (DADSD)
and DADS Module (DADSM) object, respectively. As an added layer of control,
the DADSD and DADSM objects provide a layer of abstraction where a list of ASP
and MSP objects can be managed. This is advantageous for future development
since we can derive other ASP objects with services other than the agent transfer
protocol. For instance, we could create an ASP object that listens for management
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data, or an ASP object that interacts with remote DADS daemons to handle faults.
Further, this allows the DADSM to maintain functionality that could be used to do
dynamic shutdown and loading of modules in the event that a service has been idle
for an extended period of time. In general, this added layer of abstraction separates
the dispatch functionality of the DADS object from the more in-depth protocol level
functionality provided by the ASP and MSP objects.
Finally, the top of the object hierarchy contains the DADS object. Further dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, this object is designed to dispatch service among its member
DADSD and DADSM objects. It is designed to wait for a request (i.e., connection,
data available) from both the network and from the modules, and dispatch service
accordingly. Consequently, the DADS object is responsible for calling the appropri-
ate member functions within the DADSD and DADSM to handle requests. They, in
turn, call member functions that perform the specific protocol defined within the ASP
and MSP objects, which use the functionality provided by the Network and Module
objects, respectively.
Modules
As discussed above, the DADS daemon is responsible for the management of its
service modules. A module is a process that is started by the main DADS daemon,
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hence, it can communicate with the DADS daemon using various forms of interprocess
communication (i.e., pipes, FIFO, sockets). A module can read data sent to it by
the DADS daemon from a standard input channel (see Figure 2.6) and it can use
its standard output channel to write data back. Consequently, a DADS module is
designed to read data, perform a function on that data (i.e., agents), and possibly









Figure 2.6: A Generic Module
When a module is started, it is not immediately recognized by the DADS daemon.
Instead, the module must engage in a loading protocol, thereby providing a description
of the service offered. In general, the loading protocol facilitates the construction of
a property hierarchy that is recorded within the DADS daemon. Further, the loading
protocol facilitates integrity checks to ensure that a module is authentic.
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When a module is loaded, it is described using the loading protocol, thereby facil-
itating the construction of a property hierarchy. For a host, this property hierarchy
contains a root property, referred to as Property. Similar to the agent’s root property,
this property serves as an initial search point for property comparison. As modules
are loaded, they are registered as sub-properties of the host’s root property. Thus, if
a security module is loaded, it is loaded as a security sub-property and could contain
further sub-properties that are more specific to that particular service. Likewise, if
language and fault-tolerance services are loaded, they would be included as language
and fault-tolerance sub-properties, respectively.
Module Chains
A major advantage of modules is realized through a DADS-specific concept re-
ferred to as chaining. Thus far, a module is described as a single process that interacts
with the DADS daemon. With chaining, a module can interact with other modules,
using one of two methods. The first method, illustrated in Figure 2.8, allows one
module to load another module. For instance, a fault-tolerance module may load a
language module. In this example, the fault-tolerance module receives data directly
from the DADS daemon from its stdin where the data is processed and immediately
written to stdout. The language module, which reads its stdin, receives this data for
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execution. Consequently, the module chain forces the data to be pre-processed by the
fault-tolerance module before it is handed over to the language module for execution.
In contrast, the second chaining method allows each module to be loaded indepen-
dently by the DADS and the loading protocol is used to indicate that a chain exists.
In the example above, the loading protocol would flag the language module as being
dependent on the fault-tolerance module. This dictates that the data intended for
the language module must first be sent through the fault-tolerance module. Since the
two modules input and output channels are not connected, they are unable to talk
to each other directly. Instead, the modules route the data back through the DADS
daemon. Hence, incoming data is sent to the fault-tolerance module first. Once it is
processed, the data is sent back to the DADS daemon, which then routes the data to
the appropriate language module for execution. In general, chaining is limited only by
the imagination of a module’s developers. Further, module implementations should
be kept simple, whereas chains should be used to create more complex functionality.
Module Functionality
As independent processes, modules allow the DADS to offer concurrent services.
This is advantageous since there are many issues to address in an agent system [17].
For the DADS, we can build a module to address each of these issues, however, in
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Security Mobile agents require a secure environment that can guarantee that an
agent is safe from data tampering during both execution and migration. In contrast,
hosts must be able to trust that incoming agents will not pose a serious threat to
the host (i.e., cause a crash, destroy files, etc.). In general, both the agent and
host must be safe from malicious action, hence, an important aspect of any mobile
agent system is security. Fortunately, a great deal of research is being done in this
area [9, 15], thereby offering several philosophies regarding how agent security should
be managed. Even though the design and implementation of these philosophies far
exceed the scope of this thesis, it is important to recognize that an agent system
must be able to incorporate new ideas as efficiently as possible. To accomplish this,
the DADS module system is designed for quick integration of the latest technologies,
including security. As illustrated in Figure 2.7, the DADS can handle any type of














Figure 2.7: Security Modules
It is important to authenticate agents before they are allowed to execute. If an
agent does not authenticate, a host cannot determine an agent’s source. Further, if
the agent is malicious, it is imperative that the agent be traceable back to its author.
Simple issues such as these are what drive an agent system to support a method
for agent authentication. For the DADS, authentication can be realized using one
or more authentication modules. This may include methods that support public-key
cryptography, etc.
In addition to authentication, the integrity of an agent is extremely important to
the success of the agent paradigm. Unless there are mechanisms designed to prevent
it, agent tampering (i.e., modification of an agent) is an effective way to destroy the
integrity of an agent. In particular, no entity (i.e., host, another agent) should be
able to modify an agent’s contents without its permission. In general, it is difficult
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to prevent tampering, however, it is relatively simple to detect when a change has
occurred [23]. Therefore, it would also be advantageous for DADS to include a set of
modules that can detect when agent tampering has occurred.
Any agent system must provide a robust model for security. In AgentTcl, certain
aspects of agent security are addressed using PGP [13]. Other systems, such as
TACOMA, employ a security model based on the concept of electronic cash [16]. In
general, agent systems use security models that best fit the applications they are
designed for. The DADS is no different, yet its modular design allows additional
security mechanisms to be loaded as they are needed.
Fault Tolerance In addition to security, agents must be able to recover from fatal
errors. Since an agent executes code on a remote host, agent failure may introduce
data loss. Worse, fatal error could destroy an agent, losing it altogether. Nevertheless,
if agents cannot survive in a relatively hostile environment (i.e., the Internet), the
success of agent based computing is hindered. Similar to its dependence on a platform
for execution, an agent is fully dependent on its underlying infrastructure for fault
tolerance. However, just as there are modules to support several mechanism for
security, a module like the one shown in Figure 2.8 can be added, thereby adding
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Figure 2.8: Fault Tolerance Module
To further illustrate the need for fault-tolerance, consider an agent that has exe-
cuted for several hours gathering stock information in order to make buy/sell deci-
sions. If this agent migrates to a host experiencing hardware problems, there is a high
probability that a fatal error will occur. If an error occurs, the agent along with all
of its gathered data could be lost. From a user standpoint, fatal errors could directly
result in monetary loss.
There are several solutions that could be integrated into a module. One solution
suggests that it may be possible to require the agent to send a backup of its data, at
regular intervals, to a stable and secured host. However, a problem exists if the agent
is delayed and not terminated. If timeout mechanisms are used, the host on which
the agent was created may consider the delayed agent as dead. In response, the host
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might create a new agent to pick up where its predecessor left off. Generally, this new
agent will probably follow a strategy similar to the original agent. Thus, when the
original agent is no longer delayed, two agents will be working on the same problem,
which could result in an inconsistency.
In general, it is the responsibility of the infrastructure to recover from agent error.
In the example above, neither the agent nor the infrastructure is capable of detecting
a hardware failure. However, if the infrastructure communicates with other agent
systems, crashes and agent terminations could be monitored.
There are many techniques that could address the issue of fault tolerance. Instead
of implementing all of them, the DADS allows certain fault tolerant modules to be
loaded. When used in conjunction with the transfer protocol, agents can better decide
whether the available level of fault-tolerance can guarantee the survival of the agent.
Language Availability An agent infrastructure must provide a language environ-
ment to execute its constituent agents. Since many platforms exist, it is impractical
to assume that a multi-lingual agent system will support all known languages. Nev-
ertheless, to successfully execute agents, the agent system must make a subset of
these languages available. As discussed above, data is transferred from the DADS
daemon to its modules through standard input. Illustrated in Figure 2.9, several
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Figure 2.9: Language Modules
In the DADS, language modules act as wrappers for more advanced language ser-
vices. In general, a module that is geared towards language availability will commonly
provide one or more of the following services:
Compilation: An agent is sent to the module from the DADS daemon as textual
C code. This code may require compilation before it is executed. Generally,
code compilation is used where execution speed is a concern and mobility is
infrequent.
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Interpreted Execution: An agent is sent to the module from the DADS daemon as
textual code or as a snapshot of an interpreter context. Most similar to the
agents used in TACOMA and AgentTcl, these agents are generally executed by
an interpreter.
Direct Execution: An agent is sent to the module from the DADS daemon as a snap-
shot of an operating-system process. These agents are highly dependent on the
underlying host architecture and are commonly used in environments that are
under a single administrative domain (i.e., LAN).
It is important to note that a language module is not limited to one of the above
services. If developers require other services, they are free to add a new module that
fits the needs of their application. However, as soon as a module is specialized for
speed (i.e., direct execution), the number of hosts that can execute agents within this
environment are limited. Likewise, when a module is designed for portability (i.e.,
interpreted execution) the speed of execution is degraded. Consequently, a tradeoff
exists between speed and portability. In other agent systems, this tradeoff is typically
decided by the system developers at build time.
In contrast, the DADS is a customizable agent system that allows the system
administrator(s) to decide at run-time, how resources are used to facilitate the agent
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paradigm. Using modules, the DADS is easily modified to support speed and/or
portability when it is needed. Further, since there are no limitations to the services
that can be offered as modules, the DADS acts as a portal to resources.
Development Strategy
The requirements of a module are simple. To be used with the DADS daemon,
a module must provide read and write capability on a standard input and output
channel, respectively. In addition, the module must be able to engage in a basic
protocol that allows the DADS daemon to load, unload, and manage the module.
As long as a module supports these functions, it can be written for any purpose.
Consequently, it is impossible for this thesis to list every possible path to building a
module, thus, we present a basic strategy for a module’s construction.
As discussed above, the code segment of an agent can take many forms. In partic-
ular, agent instructions can be text or they can be contained within a state-captured
image. Regardless of the format, the ultimate goal of an agent’s code is execution.
Therefore, a module must be loaded to execute the code of the agent. Illustrated in
Figure 2.10, we present a simple module which reads and executes agents written in
Perl.









Figure 2.10: A Basic Perl Module
(AF) library which contains the functionality required to interact with the DADS.
Described later, libraries like this facilitate a concept referred to as platform migration.
In addition, the library may contain functionality, such as status routines, that may
be useful to an agent. Once the library is loaded, the module registers itself with
the DADS using the AF::Register subroutine. This function engages in the loading
protocol, which sends a description of the module (i.e., property structure) to the
DADS. Once it is registered, the module enters an infinite loop where it calls and
blocks on the AF::Read subroutine. When an incoming agent is sent to the module,
it records a reference to the agent in the agent variable. Next, this reference is
used as an argument to the AF::Process subroutine, which ultimately executes the
agent code. For this type of agent, the code could be executed using the Perl eval
function. If required, modules could also support mechanisms for state-capture. In
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this environment, the module may use a design parallel to AgentTcl where a modified
interpreter reads state-captured images from standard input.
In the example above, we ignore several important issues. First, there are no
mechanisms built into the module for multi-agent execution. When an agent is sent
to the module, it is given full control of the interpreter. This means that any new
agents will have to wait until the module has finished executing a prior agent. Further,
this module offers absolutely no security. Since it is using the normal Perl interpreter,
the agent can perform any function that is available in the Perl language. In general,
modules will use more advanced techniques than what we have displayed, however,
the basic principles stay the same.
Infrastructure Protocol
A free-form agent presents an interesting dilemma when it migrates. The DADS
cannot assume that certain resources are used by an agent. Likewise, an agent cannot
assume that the DADS has made certain resources available on a host. Therefore,
before migration can occur, it is imperative to have a facility that can communicate
the properties of both agent and host. To accomplish this, the DADS uses a special
transfer protocol (TP).
The TP is a multi-step exchange that is executed between an agent and a remote
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DADS daemon. As discussed above, agents require the availability of certain language
platforms, forms of security, and/or fault-tolerant mechanisms. Further, agents may
use a data format (i.e., compression) that requires pre-processing before the agent can
be executed. From a host standpoint, security is extremely important. In a secure
setting, a host may require an agent to verify, authenticate, and/or pass integrity
checkpoints before the agent is allowed to migrate. In general, the requirements of
both an agent and host must be met before migration can occur. Since a DADS agent
contains a properties segment, it is aware of what it must communicate. Similarly,
the DADS manages the loaded modules, hence, it is aware of the services it provides.
When an agent is ready to migrate, it contacts a remote DADS enabled host and
engages in a dialogue according to the TP. Figure 2.11 illustrates this process.
Agent
(3)Agent Migration













Figure 2.11: The Transfer Protocol
In general, there are three phases to the TP. The first phase, labelled (1) in Figure
2.11 occurs when a connection is made to a DADS daemon. Once connected, an agent
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transmits a subset of the information stored in its properties segment. This is received
by the DADS, allowing it to decide which services, if they are available, it would like
the agent to use. If the DADS is unable to support the agent, the TP protocol dictates
that the DADS return a negative reply and terminate the connection. On the other
hand, if the DADS can support the agent, the TP moves to phase (2). At this point,
the DADS replies with a property hierarchy that describes its selections from phase
(1). In addition, the host transmits its capabilities (i.e., authentication methods,
etc.). Similar to host’s decision making process, this information allows the agent to
decide which services, if they are available, it would like the host to use. Finally, if
the agent supports the host’s requirements, the TP moves into the agent migration
phase (3) where authentication, and the final transmission of the agent takes place.
Similar to how an AgentTcl agent executes, a DADS agent executes within the
context of a language module. If an agent is written in Perl, it will execute within a
module that supports the Perl language. Likewise, if the agent is written in C and
requires compilation, a module is written to provide this service. If state-capture
services are needed, modules can be written with state-capture support included.
Regardless of how an agent executes, it can engage in the DADS TP using one of
three methods.
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Figure 2.12: Migration Methods
52
method requires an agent to carry the code used to perform the TP. Thus, instead of
using special functionality provided by its language platform, agents reference their
own functionality. This avoids having to modify a language platform. Further, it
increases the self-sufficiency of the agent. However, direct migration increases an
agent’s size, making this form of migration less efficient.
The second method, shown in Figure 2.12b is referred to as platform migration.
This method is most similar to the forms of migration found in today’s agent systems.
Using a modified language platform, agents make function calls to special subroutines
that perform the TP. By moving the migration functionality into the language en-
vironment, agent size is reduced, hence, the agents are more efficient. In general,
platform migration is the fastest migration technique, however, it may require the
modification of a language platform.
Finally, the third method, shown in Figure 2.12c is referred to as proxy migration.
This method addresses the burden of extra code in direct migration. In addition, it
addresses the modified language environment requirement in platform-migration. In
this method, the TP is integrated into the DADS daemon. As discussed above, an
agent executes within the context of a language module. Further, all DADS modules
have the ability to interact with the DADS daemon. This allows a module to send
and receive data through an interface connected to the DADS. Proxy migration takes
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advantage of this interface, allowing an agent to send its image and data back to the
DADS. Thus, when an agent decides to migrate, it can contact the daemon and send
an agent image along with a destination address. The daemon then contacts a remote
DADS and performs the TP. If the transfer is successful, the agent on the local host
is terminated.
A tendency of today’s agent systems is to use some variant of platform migration.
While this facilitates faster and more efficient agents, it also tends to limit an agent
to a single methodology for code mobility. With the DADS, agents can supply their
own mobility functionality (direct migration), or use the DADS daemon to facilitate
migration (proxy migration).
Development Strategy
Autonomy introduces a significant burden on an agent. As discussed above, a
DADS agent is free-form and it is not limited to a standard system-wide language,
security model, or fault tolerance system. Similarly, the DADS daemon is also free-
form in that different hosts may provide different types of services. Therefore, we
have developed the TP to facilitate agent migration to remote DADS hosts.
The TP is responsible for the exchange of property hierarchies between an agent
and host. That is, it defines how to transmit a description regarding a host’s available
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Figure 2.13: Transfer Protocol Flowchart
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resources to an an agent and vice-versa. Since both an agent and host are aware
of their properties, each can decide if migration should take place, based on the
properties of the other. Described in detail by Figure 2.13, the TP does not define
the content of the exchange. Instead, it defines the decision making process, which is
used by an agent and host to make a migration decision.
Illustrated in Figure 2.13, the TP also includes mechanisms for authentication.
In the DADS, an agent can migrate without performing any form of authentication.
While it may pose a security risk, we feel that this, along with many other config-
uration decisions, should be left to a hosts administrator(s). However, if security is
important, then authentication is facilitated by the TP. It is important to note that
the TP does not define the authentication method. This is provided by a security
module designed for that purpose. Instead, the TP calls the authentication service,
which ultimately returns a positive or negative response. This reply alters the TP
flow accordingly (i.e., accept or deny the agent).
In the context of the DADS daemon implementation, the TP code is encapsulated
within the DADSD object. As discussed above, the DADSD is responsible for agent
acceptance, hence, it follows that it is responsible for the TP. To be more specific,
the TP code is further encapsulated within an ASP object (see Figure 3.1). In the
initial DADS implementation, the ASP object is designed to handle agents using
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the TCP/IP protocol suite. Further, it provides a simple interface that the DADSD
object understands. The primary advantage of this is the expandability for future
protocols. If support for future protocols is required, the protocol definition and
functionality is simply placed in additional ASP objects. Therefore, as long as the
ASP object provides a standard interface, protocols can be added without having to




The focus of the DADS implementation is simple; an efficient, low resource foot-
print, system level application that can handle high numbers of incoming agents.
Further, it must be portable and robust enough to facilitate future development. To
accomplish this, we have used the C++ language to develop the major portions of
the DADS system. Supporting object orientation, C++ is a language that can sup-
port the proposed development strategies discussed above. In addition, it avoids the
overhead of using a virtual machine such as Java. This chapter discusses the details
concerning the implementation of the DADS system. In particular, it discusses the
DADS daemon and its dispatching system. Further, this chapter discusses the state-
machines that control and perform the transfer and module loading protocols. And
finally, it discusses the necessary functionality that is needed for a module to operate.
DADS Daemon
Probably the most important piece of the DADS system, the DADS Daemon
is responsible for incoming agents and the modules that execute them. Illustrated
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in Figure 2.5, the main DADS object is a container object designed to encapsulate
both the network (DADSD) and module (DADSM) systems. Since these services are
maintained in separate objects, it is also the responsibility of the DADS object to
coordinate and control them. In other words, the DADS object is responsible for
dispatching control to the DADSD and DADSM when they require attention (e.g.,
connection, data available). Hence, it is imperative that the DADS be able to detect
when one of its constituent objects require attention. This is accomplished using a
mechanism referred to as a hook, which, in its initial implementation is simply a file
descriptor (i.e., socket). Illustrated in Figure 3.1, when a DADS object is instantiated,
its constructor instantiates its member objects, dadsd and dadsm. Using the methods
provided by these objects, the DADS object retrieves a set of hooks from its members,
using the ReturnHooks method, which allows it to place the returned values into its
member array labelled hooks.
The DADS daemon is designed to run as a single process, hence, it must be
able to process data quickly and without any delay. Thus, if the DADS object is
a single daemon that dispatches service to the network and module systems, then
how does it give one side attention without introducing delays on the other? More
specifically, what happens if a connection becomes idle while sending large amounts

























Figure 3.1: DADS Objects
60
the connection has sent its full payload, the module may have to wait a significant
amount of time (maybe forever) before it is processed. Consequently, this is where
hooks are important.
Since they are descriptors, hooks can indicate when they are ready to perform I/O.
If they are set non-blocking [25], the functions that use the descriptors will return
if there is nothing to do (i.e., idle connection, full read/write buffer). When used in
conjunction with a multiplexing system call such as poll or select, the DADS dispatch
logic can sit and listen to the various hooks until I/O service is requested. Since
the descriptors are non-blocking, system calls such as read or write will only return
as much data as is available at that time. However, this comes at a price. Since
the system calls can return without reading or writing a complete payload, it is the
responsibility of the higher-level code to keep track of where the last operation left off.
To address this, the DADSD and DADSM objects maintain ASP and MSP objects.
These objects encapsulate independent state-machines that track the progress of the
protocol for each module and connection.
In general, the DADS daemon begins to service requests (i.e., listen on network,
load modules) when its ServiceLoop method is called. This function enters an infinite
service loop which listens for I/O activity, via the hooks, using the select system call.
If a request from the DADSD is detected (i.e., connection, data), the DADS processes
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the request with a call to the DADSD ProcessRequest method. Likewise, if a request
comes from the DADSM (i.e., load a module, module error, etc.), the DADS handles
the event in a similar fashion. While it can be argued that the DADSD and DADSM
objects are extraneous, their presence allows future developers to add ASP and MSP
objects that encapsulate state-machines for services that supplement the transfer and
module-loading protocols.
ASP
The ASP object provides the functionality used to engage in the agent transfer
protocol. As such, it is responsible for setting up a server which listens on the network
for incoming connections. In addition, since the daemon uses non-blocking descrip-
tors, the ASP object must maintain state for each connection. To accomplish this, the
ASP object maintains two very important member variables, namely a TCPServer
object and a list of Connection objects.
Derived from the Network service object, a TCPServer object encapsulates all the
functionality necessary to setup and maintain a TCP server. In addition, it provides
an Accept method, which accepts a connection and returns a TCPClient object. De-
signed to make the DADS networking code clear and concise, the objects provided




















unsigned int b read;
unsigned int b written; 20
};
Figure 3.2: Connection Object
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In order to track the state of each connected client, the ASP object also maintains
a list of connection objects. Illustrated in Figure 3.2, a connection object is used
to record client-specific information, where each member variable is used for the
following:
TCPClient *incoming: Tracks the network connection information, this is used to
communicate with the client.
Session *session: When a client engages in I/O with a module, a Session is created.
Thus, when a client sends data to a module, it uses the Session to determine
the module it is supposed to write to.
Agent *agent: Information that is gathered from the client is placed within this
Agent object (see Figure 2.4).
enum {...} p state: Records the current state of the connection as it relates to the
protocol of the particular ASP object.
unsigned int b read: Tracks how many bytes have been read in the current state.
unsigned int b written: Tracks how many bytes have been written in the current
state.
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As clients connect, new connection objects are created to track their progress
through the transfer protocol, hence, these objects are maintained for the duration
of the connection. If the client terminates the connection or is idle for an extended
period of time, the corresponding object is removed from the list, thereby closing the
connection.
With the connection data structure, it is possible to keep state for multiple connec-
tions and track their progress as they engage in the transfer protocol. In particular,
state is needed since non-blocking code must assume that a connection is sending
one-byte at a time (i.e., a latent connection). To better understand how the protocol
works, Table 3.1 defines each state and discusses how they interpret the incoming
data. It is important to note that at any point, the state can return to IDLE, which
indicates that some part of the protocol was violated (e.g DATA SPEC indicates an
agent size that is too large), thereby causing the connection to be terminated.
A particularly interesting feature of the protocol is located in the AUTH INIT
and AUTH ENGAGE phases of the protocol. Up to this point, an incoming agent
has sent all three of its segments to the DADS, however, the agent has not yet been
accepted. The reasoning behind this lies in the fact that some authentication pro-
tocols, particularly hashing and public-key mechanisms, may require that the agent
information already be present on the host. That is, in order for the authentication
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State Next State Description
IDLE CODE SPEC New connections begin in an IDLE
state. State transitions after the object
has initialized.
CODE SPEC DATA SPEC State transitions when the size (4 bytes)
of the code segment has been received.
DATA SPEC PROP SPEC State transitions when the size (4 bytes)
of the data segment has been received.
PROP SPEC CODE CONTENT State transitions when the size (4 bytes)
of the property segment has been re-
ceived.
CODE CONTENT DATA CONTENT State transitions when CODE SPEC
number of bytes have been received.
DATA CONTENT PROP CONTENT State transitions when DATA SPEC
number of bytes have been received.
PROP CONTENT PROP CHECK State transitions when PROP SPEC
number of bytes have been received.
PROP CHECK AUTH INIT or AC-
CEPTANCE
State transitions when the services are
selected from the incoming property hi-
erarchy.
AUTH INIT AUTH ENGAGE If authentication is required, state tran-
sitions when a positive reply is obtained
from authentication module.
AUTH ENGAGE ACCEPTANCE State transitions when agent has been
notified that it has been accepted.
ACCEPTANCE IDLE Return to IDLE state, and terminate
connection.
Table 3.1: ASP State Descriptions
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to occur, the module needs to have access to the complete agent. If we were to de-
lay the transmission of the agent until after authentication, then it is possible for
a remote agent to provide false information and perhaps send contents that do not
match the authentication. By sending the contents of the agent first, the particular
module can use the local copy instead of having to trust that the remote agent will
send valid data. Further, if interaction is required, the module can communicate with
the remote agent and use the local copy for verification.
MSP
The efficient implementation of a module management system creates a very inter-
esting problem. Since the DADS daemon can support simultaneous client connections,
a problem arises when multiple clients want to use the services of a single module.
For instance, several clients may need to participate in authentication. If only a single
authentication module is loaded, only one client can use that service at a time. This
is a problem since it not only degrades the performance of the DADS system, but it
also potentially makes the DADS vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack. Therefore,
it is imperative that the DADS employ a mechanism that can provide module service
for more than one incoming client. To address this, we have created the MSP object.
In practice, when the DADS loads a module, it create an MSP object. This object
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takes two parameters, namely a module name (i.e., filename to load) and a number
which dictates how many copies of the module to start. By starting multiple copies
of the module, the MSP object is able to manage a set of identical modules which
can be used to service concurrent connections. Thus, when a connection requires
service from a module, it creates a relationship between itself and one of the available
modules managed by the MSP object. This relationship, referred to as a session,
binds the client to the module for the duration of the client connection. By default,
an MSP object supports only one session per module. That is, no other connections
can interact with the module until the current session is terminated. In general,
the single session per module approach is not a panacea to the concurrent connection
problem (i.e., more connections than available modules); however, it provides a better
solution than having only a single available module.
To fully address the problem, an MSP object also supports a multiple sessions per
module mode. In this mode, only a single module copy is loaded, however, the module
is written to handle concurrent connections. Therefore, when multiple connections
require service from the module, separate sessions are created for each connection.
These sessions employ unique identifiers that are used to tag data. Thus, when a
module receives data from the DADS, it can use the tag to determine the source.
While this may complicate the implementation of a module, it avoids the overhead
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Figure 3.3: Session Object
In order to track its sessions, the MSP object maintains a list of Session objects.
Illustrated in Figure 3.3, a session object uses its member variables to achieve the
following
Connection *client: Tracks the incoming connection so that information can be
written back to the connected client. This is similar to how a connection object
uses a session object to determine which module it needs to write to.
Module *module: Tracks which module the connected client is currently using.
enum {...} p state: Records the current state of the session. Currently only two
states exist: IDLE, which indicates that the module is available for use, and
BUSY, which indicates that it is being used.
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MSP *msp: Since a connection object maintains a session, this pointer allows the
connection object to directly reference the MSP that this session is a part of.
As discussed above, the MSP object, by default, maintains only a single session
per module. However, if the module is designed to support it, it can specify during
the loading protocol, that the MSP object should use multiple sessions per module.
Therefore, using these MSP objects, the DADS can provide a flexible interface that
allows its modules to decide on how they are used.
Module
A module is an independent process that is attached, via a pipe, to the main
DADS daemon. As such, the daemon must be able to organize module information
(i.e., state, pid, pipe information), into a single object that can be easily managed by
an MSP object. Introduced in Figure 2.5, the DADS daemon uses a Module service
object to encapsulate this module information. Further, this object is responsible
for loading and executing (i.e., fork and exec) an executable file. Therefore, when a
module object is instantiated, it takes a filename as a parameter and creates a child
process of the DADS daemon.
As soon as the child process is loaded, the code that has been started must im-
mediately engage in the loading protocol. In general, the loading protocol is a two
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step process, where the state of the protocol is maintained within the module object
discussed above. The first step, registers the module with the DADS daemon. In par-
ticular, this step facilitates the merging of the module’s property description into the
daemon’s main property hierarchy. Thus, in its most basic form, the loading protocol
only requests that a module send its property description to the DADS daemon. For
the loading protocol, this requires that a module object only keep track of two states,
namely a LOAD and READY state. When this object is in the LOAD state, data
coming from the child process is used for creating a property description. When the
full property description is received by the daemon, the module object transitions its
state to READY. At this point, incoming data from the module is either forwarded
to a client engaged in a session, or it is forwarded to another module (i.e., module
chain).
In practice, modules will most likely be written to load standard libraries that
incoming agents can use. In the event that an agent uses a form of direct migration,
no library is necessary since the agent contains all the functionality that it needs.
However, as soon as an agent uses platform migration, the agent assumes that certain
functionality is provided by the underlying execution platform. For a simple module
like the one described in Figure 2.10, the code loads a library (AF) to make a set
of functions and variables available for an agent to use when it executes. To better
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understand what is provided by such a library, Table 3.2 gives a description of the
functions and variables that are available to any agent that executes within this
environment. For this particular module, we assume that the module supports the
Name Context Purpose
Code Variable Holds the agent code. Could be modified by the
agent to create self-modifying code.
Data Variable Holds the agent data. Stores information such as
itinerary and agent state.
Prop Variable Holds the agent properties string. Stores informa-
tion such as itinerary and agent state.
Move Function Functionality used migrate an agent.
Register Function Registers the module with the DADS daemon.
Read Function Used to read an agent from the DADS daemon.
Post Function Used to write data, if necessary, to the DADS dae-
mon.
Process Function Used to execute the agent (i.e., eval).
Table 3.2: AF Library Functionality
single session per module mode, as described above. That is, only one agent will
execute in this environment at a time. Consequently, this allows the library to provide
the global variables: Code, Data, and Prop which can be used by the agent to access
its respective segments. When multiple agents are allowed to execute within a single




The agent paradigm introduces an alternative method for solving problems in
distributed computing. Agents add a layer of intelligence to the more traditional
forms of remote programming, such as RPC and Mobile Objects. Further, agents
provide a level of autonomy not realized in other forms of remote programming sys-
tems. When combined, these qualities can be exploited to offer effective solutions to
many problems. In this chapter we provide an example application of the DADS. In
particular, the following example is designed to illustrate the migration and execution
of an agent, the operation of the transfer protocol, and the use of the DADS module
system. It is important to note that this example illustrates the operation of a simple
agent within a basic DADS environment, hence, we make certain assumptions about
the network in which the agent(s) exist.
Application - Intrusion Detector
The security of a network and its constituent hosts is an important responsibility
for any system administrator. Further, as the number of hosts on a network increase,
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so too does the overhead of monitoring each system for a potential compromise. When
network growth exceeds the monitoring abilities of its network administrators, some
systems may be ignored in favor of more mission-critical ones.
In many ways, this problem lends itself to a solution founded in traditional client-
server methods, where a centralized server listens as systems report, via the network,
their current security status. If the status of these systems is polled frequently,
a significant amount of network bandwidth may be wasted. To address this, the
administrator(s) could employ an agent based solution. That is, instead of introducing
large amounts of network traffic where clients repeatedly report normal status, an
agent may be deployed which can migrate to each host and take appropriate action
when abnormal status is detected. Illustrated in Figure 4.1, we present a Perl agent for
the detection of an abnormal process. Also, for this example, it is assumed that each
participating host has loaded the Perl module that has been discussed throughout
this thesis. For this example, an agent of this type may also contain additional
mechanisms for log-file analysis and file-system inspection. However, agent based
intrusion detection is beyond the scope of this thesis, hence, we focus on a simple
agent implementation to exemplify basic DADS principles.
In addition to code, the agent contains a segment for data. During execution,
this data may change according to how the agent perceives its environment. Before
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hostname = ‘hostname‘; // Retrieve the systems name
 
process list = ‘ps −axu‘; // Retrieve a list of running processes
@data fields = split(":",
 










// If we have been sent back to the original host,
// alert the administrator, because something is amiss!
print stderr "A system has been hacked!\n"; 10
return;
}




compromised = 1; last SWITCH; }
if (/DOS−master/) {
 
compromised = 1; last SWITCH; }
if (/hackedprogram/) {
 




// Uh oh, one of the malicious programs were running.





AF::data .= ":" .
 















#itinerary+1]; // Select a random host to migrate to 30
AF::Move(
 
to); // This system is clean, move to the next host
Figure 4.1: Intrusion Detection Agent
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injection, the agent data segment contains the following information:





In general, an agent would contain more detailed data. For instance, it might reference
the data segment for known signatures of malicious programs. However, we have
reduced the data size for brevity.
The purpose of this agent is simple, detect and report when a host is execut-
ing one or more malicious programs. For this example, the agent assumes that the
ps, and hostname executables have not been replaced with trojaned versions. More
specifically, the programs return correct data when they are executed.
When this agent migrates to a host, it begins by retrieving a list of running
processes on the host. In addition, it records the name of the host that it resides
on. In order to perform its task, the agent retrieves data from its data segment, via
the global AF::data variable. Since the agent is written to understand the format of
its data segment, it knows how to parse the AF::data variable in order to retrieve
information.
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Once the agent determines the name of the host on which it currently resides, the
agent retrieves the name of the host that initially injected it. For this example, the
agent migrates between the hosts in its itinerary until it has found a compromised
host. Once it has found a host that fits the compromise criteria, the agent returns to
the host from which it was injected. Thus, as the agent code illustrates, if the current
host is identical to the injector host, then the agent has found a compromised host
and has returned home to alert the administrator.
When the agent migrates between hosts in its itinerary, it engages in a series of
checks to determine whether a system that it currently resides on has been compro-
mised. This involves a regular expression match that searches for particular strings
within a process listing (i.e., ps). If it finds a match, the agent flags a variable to
indicate that the host has been compromised. If a compromised host is found, the
agent records some basic information about the host (i.e., process listing and host-
name) and returns to the injector to report the status. Otherwise, the agent selects
a random host from its itinerary and migrates, repeating the process forever.
Thus far, we have described the goals and actions that the agent will take to
complete its task. If the agent was static, its execution would be simple; however,
our agent must be able to migrate randomly between four hosts found in its itinerary.
This means that at some point, the agent will have to engage in the transfer protocol.
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For this particular example, the agent uses platform migration, where functionality
to engage in the transfer protocol is provided by the library loaded by the module.
In order for the transfer protocol to work, the agent and the hosts listed in its
itinerary must provide property hierarchies that describe their capabilities and re-
quirements. Illustrated in Figure 4.2a, the agent’s property hierarchy is rooted with
the standard Property property which contains a sub-property path that describes its
only requirement, a version 5.6.1 Perl interpreter.
Similar to other data structures, a property hierarchy can easily be represented
using a textual string. This greatly simplifies transmission since it allows the agent
to carry its description as a text string. In its current implementation, the textual
format uses the same fields that were introduced with the property data structure
discussed earlier. Thus, to represent the agent’s property hierarchy, the textual string
































































Figure 4.2: Property Hierarchies
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To make this example interesting, suppose that in addition to a Perl module, each of
the hosts have also loaded two other language modules, namely Python and Tcl. Thus,
after the module loading protocol has occurred, each host should contain a property
hierarchy similar to the one displayed in Figure 4.2b. Similar to the agent, the host
also maintains a textual representation of its property hierarchy for transmission.
At this point, our environment consists of an agent and five hosts that are execut-
ing the DADS daemon. Each host has loaded the Perl, Python, and Tcl modules and
each are ready to accept incoming agents. Therefore, to begin agent execution, we
use the special injector program to build the agent and boot-strap it into the DADS
infrastructure. In particular, our injector program:
1. Reads the agent code.
2. Reads the agent data.
3. Reads the agent property description.
4. Connects to a remote DADS host.
5. Engages in the transfer protocol.
80
As soon as the agent has been successfully injected, the agent is forwarded to a module
for execution. The agent is now fully autonomous, thus, the agent should not return
to the injector host until it has discovered that a malicious program is running on
one of the hosts in its itinerary.
An agent must engage in the transfer protocol to migrate to a remote host. For
the example agent, the transfer protocol informs a remote DADS that an incoming
agent would like to use the Perl interpreter. To accomplish this, both the agent and
host use their property hierarchy information to make decisions about the services
that are provided. This requires the exchange of property information, which is used
to initialize an environment for agent authentication (not used in this example) and
execution.
To better understand the transfer protocol, assume that our agent is to be in-
jected from the host, injector.nrl.csci.unt.edu, to a remote DADS-enabled host, al-
pha.ameslab.gov. Therefore, to inject the agent, we execute the injection program
which engages in an information exchange similar to what is displayed in Figure
4.3. For this agent, the exchange occurs in four steps. The first step transmits
the entire agent to the remote host. The complete agent is transmitted since many
forms of authentication (i.e., hashing, PKI, etc.) may require a complete image of
the agent. Discussed earlier, the host cannot trust that an agent is sending correct
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The agent has no capabilities
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injector.nrl.csci.unt.edu
Figure 4.3: Transfer Protocol Exchange
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authentication information, thus, a local copy is kept for verification. It is important
to note that this initial copy of the agent is the only copy that is sent during the
entire protocol. If the protocol results in agent acceptance, then the copy is sent to
a module for further execution and the remote agent is informed that the agent was
accepted. However, if at any point during the protocol the agent is not accepted (i.e.,
fails authentication, host cannot support agent), then this copy is deleted and the
remote agent is informed that migration was denied.
In addition to a copy of the agent, the first step of the protocol dictates that
the agent send a property hierarchy comprised of the agent’s capabilities. As Figure
4.2a illustrates, the example agent has no capabilities, only requirements. When the
host receives this information, it selects from the agent’s capabilities the services that
it wants the agent to use. If the host determines that the agent is not capable of
supporting a service which the host requires, the host denies the migration request.
In this example, the host does not have any requirements (see Figure 4.2b), hence,
the protocol moves to the next step.
Next, the host sends a reply containing two separate property hierarchies. The
first hierarchy describes the capabilities that were selected by the host for the agent to
use (in this case none). The second hierarchy contains the host’s capabilities. Similar
to how the host selected capabilities that it wanted the agent to use, the agent now
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uses this second property hierarchy to select the services it wants to use on the host.
If the agent determines that the host cannot support the services it requires, the
connection is terminated and the protocol is reset. In this example, the agent’s only
requirement is the Perl interpreter, which is supported by the host. Therefore, the
protocol moves to the third step where it replies with the selections that it made.
Finally, as soon as both sides of the protocol have agreed that they can support
each other, the host replies with ACCEPTED. This lets the remote agent know that
the copy (already local to the DADS) is being forwarded to a module for execution. In
general, when an ACCEPTED reply is received, the agent that initiated the migration
has two options. The first option is to terminate, allowing the recently migrated code
to continue the agent’s legacy. The second option is to continue execution, thereby
allowing the migrated code to execute in parallel with itself.
There are several issues that we ignore in this example. First, if a language module
crashes during agent execution, the agent is lost. Second, there are no mechanisms
for security, hence, neither a host nor agent can be fully trusted. While they are both
important issues, each of these problems could be solved as described earlier with the




The application of an agent-based solution requires a system that provides delivery
and execution services for mobile code and data. In addition, such a system should
be efficient and secure. There are many agent systems that answer this demand, how-
ever, many of them are based in virtual machine architectures as well as proprietary
designs. Not only has this impeded the advancement of the agent paradigm, but it
has also created a library of agent systems that use fairly complex methods which are
incompatible with other systems. While standards such as FIPA and MASIF have
been developed to address issues such as system interoperability, many systems still
do not conform to them.
To address some of these issues, this thesis has presented the design and imple-
mentation of a Distributed Agent Delivery System (DADS). Designed for simplicity
and flexibility, the DADS is an agent platform focused on the delivery and execution
of multi-lingual agents. Using a modular design similar to AgentTcl, the DADS uses
its module system to act as a gateway to resources. In addition to language execu-
tion, the DADS module system potentially provides access to an unlimited range of
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services.
This thesis has discussed some of the advantages and disadvantages found in many
of todays mobile agent systems. This included a review of several infrastructures,
ranging from those that use a strictly virtual machine design (i.e., Telescript, Aglets)
to systems designed for multi-lingual agents (i.e., AgentTcl). Each of these systems
offer new concepts that have influenced the DADS design in one form or another.
In addition, this thesis has discussed the issues that are encountered when design-
ing an agent for a mobile agent infrastructure. As described above, agent systems
commonly use an agent design that has been developed to fit the needs of their own,
sometimes proprietary, infrastructure. More specifically, the agent is defined to fit a
set of particular requirements (i.e., language, security, etc.) which optimize proper-
ties of that system. Commonly, this limits the portability and interoperability of the
system when it is used in conjunction with other agent systems.
In contrast to a proprietary design, the DADS uses an agent that exists solely
as a container for code mobility. Strongly influenced by the agents of TACOMA,
a DADS agent relies on a three segment model which is used to store code, data,
and a set of descriptive properties. Without limiting an agent’s content, code and
data segments store arbitrary sequences of bits. This means that DADS agents are
inherently multi-lingual, hence, they can use any language and format for their data.
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However, it is imperative for this type of free-form agent to understand its capabilities
and requirements. Thus, DADS agents also contain a specially designed property
segment to maintain a concise description of the agent’s code and data segments.
A DADS daemon addresses the requirements of a host by allowing it to participate
in agent based solutions. In particular, the DADS satisfies a host’s obligation to
accept and execute mobile agents from a network. Since a host ultimately executes
an agent using its resources, it is imperative for that host to provide an entry point.
As a result, the DADS uses its daemon to listen on the network for incoming agents.
When an agent has been accepted, it is forwarded by the daemon to its collection of
loadable service modules. In the DADS, modules are responsible for providing agent
services.
Influenced heavily by AgentTcl, modules allow the DADS to support a hetero-
geneous blend of agents. Supporting services ranging from language execution and
security to fault-tolerance, modules provide agents with access to resources. In addi-
tion, this thesis discussed the design and implementation of a generic module, which
can be used as a model for the design of future modules. In general, modules provide
the system administrator(s) with a customizable agent system that can be adjusted
to fit the policies of an institution.
As a binding mechanism between the free-form DADS agent and the customizable
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DADS daemon, the DADS system uses a special transfer protocol to facilitate agent
migration across heterogenous systems. More specifically, it defines the procedure
used to exchange information from an agent’s property segment, which allows each
entity to decide whether it can support the services of the other.
Agents are autonomous entities. Further, if an agent creates another agent,
through a process referred to as cloning, then it is possible to have a very large
number of agents in a network. If left unchecked, this could potentially lead to an
excessive population causing degradation in network performance. In general, agent
population control is an important topic to consider in an agent system. However,
since it is a fairly new topic, there are many new ideas that have been proposed to
solve this problem. In particular, a naming system could be used where new agents
are registered with a central naming authority [22]. Thus, before a new agent is cre-
ated, the naming authority could be queried facilitating a decision whether too many
agents already exist. Second, a biological model based on pheromones could also be
used [2]. Thus, as agents move from host to host, they leave a virtual residue that
decays over time. As new agents migrate to this host, they use the residue to deter-
mine the last time an agent visited that host. In general, this will enable an agent
to make a more informed decisions about cloning. Regardless of its implementation,
experiments in population control require an agent platform that can emulate new
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concepts without sweeping redesigns of the supporting infrastructure. In the DADS,
concepts like this can be added using new modules, making it a very attractive system
for experimental agent research.
Future Work
Conforming to the strategies discussed throughout this thesis, the implementation
of a stable version of the DADS system is almost complete. Having developed the
foundation code for the DADS daemon, future development is now focused on the
creation of a library of service modules. Since they provide the core agent services, the
development of additional modules will hopefully increase the viability and usefulness
of the DADS system. In particular, it is imperative that the initial focus for module
development be placed on mechanisms for security and fault-tolerance. Currently,
work is being done to adapt the security model used for Grid computing [11] using
proxy-certificates [24] into a module based agent-authentication mechanism. Further,
development has already begun on modules that support the Python, Perl, and C
language.
Future development will address the design of tools that can be used for the
management and visualization of agents executing within the DADS system. In
particular, tools that can graphically monitor the status of DADS-enabled hosts and
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report the identities of resident agents would benefit both administrators and users
alike.
As soon as a stable module base has been established, DADS development will
move into a performance analysis phase. This phase will provide a review of the
DADS as it stands in comparison to other agent systems. Since it provides a generic
platform for agent execution, it is expected that the DADS will perform slower when
compared to systems such as AgentTcl. In particular, the transfer protocol will have
a significant effect on the amount of time required by an agent migration. Since the
AgentTcl system knows the exact format of the agents that it receives, it will not need
to engage in an agreement protocol like that of the DADS. Consequently, this creates
another area for future work, optimizing the transfer protocol. In addition, work will
be done to migrate certains aspects of the transfer protocol to use a standards based
format, such as the eXtended Markup Language (XML).
In its current implementation, the DADS has been developed using the libraries
and functionality provided by the Linux1 operating system. In the future, the DADS
will be ported to other operating systems, making it cross-platform.
The DADS is an extendable agent system designed for flexibility. As such, it
provides a solid base for future work in agent research.







// The following is a declaration of the Network class.
// This class is designed to encapsulate all information
// related to networking. It provides a super class from









struct hostent *GetHostByName(char *hostname);
int GetServiceByName(char *servname);
int GetSocketNumber();
int Read(char *buf,int buflen);
int Write(char *buf,int buflen);
















// The following is a declaration of the Server class
// This class is designed to encapsulate all information
// related to a tcp/ip server. This class is derived from
// the Network class which contains a wide variety of network







class Server : public Network {
public:













// The following is the declaration of the Client class
// This class is designed to encapsulate all information
// related to a tcp/ip client. This class is derived from
// the Network class which contains a wide variety of network






class Client : public Network {
public:
Client(int cs, const sockaddr_in *addr,
socklen_t len);













// The following is a declaration of the TCPClient and
// TCPServer class. These classes are designed to
// encapsulate all information related to TCP specific
// client and servers. These classes are derived directly







class TCPClient : public Client {
public:
TCPClient(char *host, int port);
~TCPClient();
};









// The following is a declaration of the UDPClient and
// UDPServer class. These classes are designed to
// encapsulate all information related to UDP specific
// client and servers. These classes are derived directly







class UDPClient : public Client {
public:
UDPClient(char *host, int port);
~UDPClient();
};
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